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INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an annual update of the authorized trade in small arms and light weapons. It examines trends 
in the trade, and provides information on major exporters and importers, whom they trade with, and in what types of 
weapons. The lack of transparency on the part of many important suppliers and recipients in this global trade makes 
this effort an uphill battle. In fact, although the issue of small arms and light weapons has been on the international 
agenda for over a decade, few, if any, states provide full information on their small arms and light weapons exports 
and imports. So clearly, the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, introduced in Small Arms Survey 2004, remains 
an important tool. 
Following up on the analysis of the illicit trade in Europe in Small Arms Survey 2005, this chapter provides more 
systematic information on the illicit trade in South America. The analysis is based on two sources of internationally 
comparable data partially available for the illicit trade, namely customs and police seizure data.
The main findings of the chapter include the following.
• According to available data and estimates, the top exporters of small arms and light weapons by value (exporting 
at least USD 100 million of small arms and light weapons, including parts and ammunition, annually) in 2003—the 
latest year for which data is available—were the Russian Federation, the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, and 
China. Compared to 2002 and 2001, the only change is that Belgium was no longer among the top exporters in 2003.
• The top importers (importing to the value of at least USD 100 million) for 2003, according to customs data, were 
the United States, Cyprus, and Germany. Top importers tend to vary more than top exporters, but the United States 
and Cyprus were both on the list for 2001, 2002, and 2003.
• Among the major exporters of small arms and light weapons, the most transparent are the United States and 
Germany. The least transparent are Bulgaria, Iran, Israel, and North Korea, all scoring zero on the Small Arms Trade 
Transparency Barometer.
• Customs data in South America has strong limitations in terms of systematization, organization, and comparability. 
Police data indicates that in this region diversion from military stockpiles from neighbouring countries is as serious 
a problem as international arms trafficking. 
THE AUTHORIZED GLOBAL SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS TRADE: ANNUAL UPDATE
This section provides an update on the authorized global small arms and light weapons trade. It focuses on the major 
exporters and importers, their top trading partners, and the main products exchanged.1 It includes information on 
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small arms and light weapons, their parts and accessories, and small arms (as opposed to light weapons) ammunition. 
Light weapons ammunition is excluded because of reporting limitations. In customs data, light weapons ammunition 
exports/imports are reported in the same category as ammunition for large conventional weapons. There is no way 
to single out the former from the latter, hence mixed ammunition categories were excluded from the calculations.2 
However, the trade in military small arms and light weapons is most likely underestimated because of limited trans-
parency on the part of many countries and the lack of reporting for certain types of military weapons.
As in previous years, calculations are provided by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) based 
on customs data from UN Comtrade. Today, UN Comtrade is the most comprehensive source of comparable informa-
tion on the trade in small arms and light weapons.3 Although customs data is compared with national arms export 
report figures whenever possible, calculations are nevertheless based only on customs data. The main reasons for this 
are to ensure comparability across countries and to avoid double counting. Figures represent financial values rather 
than quantities. Another limitation of the data is the time lag in reporting. A number of states do not report promptly 
to UN Comtrade on their imports and exports, and states can correct their information for more than a year after 
submission. The following analysis therefore uses 2003 data unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
Also as in previous years, ‘mirror statistics’ are used to get a more complete picture of the trade. Mirror data relies 
on importers’ declarations of their imports to calculate exporters’ exports and vice versa. Whoever uses mirror statistics 
is regularly faced with the necessity of choosing between an importer’s declaration of an import and the exporter’s 
reporting on the same transaction when there are discrepancies between the two figures. In such cases, NISAT, 
following a model developed by the International Trade Centre, has used a reliability measure to select whose report-
ing to rely on.4
Using UN Comtrade has its advantages and disadvantages. While steps have been taken to strengthen its utility, 
the current approach—analyzing UN Comtrade data in the light of additional information supplied by national 
reports—has its limitations. Regional reporting mechanisms such as those used in West Africa and in Europe could 
be more fully mined for data. Lack of transparency, selective and incomplete reporting, and, in the case of the EU 
Code of Conduct, a focus on licences granted and not actual deliveries all explain why these sources of information 
are not currently incorporated into the global assessments presented here. The inescapable element of human error 
(see Box 3.1) can affect any reporting instrument and is not limited to UN Comtrade.
The documented value of all small arms and light weapons exports in 2003 (as reported to UN Comtrade) is 
around USD 2 billion. In 2002 the figure was similar (around USD 2.1 billion) (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 98). Levels 
of transparency, in particular by important exporters and on the main categories of small arms and light weapons, 
have remained roughly the same as in previous years. Little, for example, is still known about Russian and Chinese 
exports from customs data sources. Moreover, information on certain types of small arms and light weapons (such as 
light weapons ammunition and certain types of military small arms and light weapons, including the very high-value 
man-portable air defence systems—MANPADS) is aggregated with information from other weapons types and thus 
Box 3.1 A CHaotic tale: why export and import data does not always match
UN Comtrade, like any database, suffers from occasional human error. For example, Sudan reported that it had accidentally—
and possibly routinely—entered ‘CH’ to record its imports of weapons from China.5 CH, however, is not the code for China in 
UN Comtrade reporting. CN is. CH is the code for Switzerland, and stands for Confoederatio Helvetica.
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Box 3.2 Authorized global transfers of small arms ammunition
An examination of authorized small arms ammunition transfers over the period 1999—2003 (the last five years for which data 
is available from UN Comtrade) shows that the trade in ammunition makes up a large portion of the overall small arms trade. 
During this period, the share of small arms ammunition exports as part of total small arms and light weapons exports was 
about one-third (see Figure 3.1).
Ammunition, in contrast to the arms themselves, is a consumable good. This means that users must regularly procure fresh 
supplies. Trade patterns for ammunition of individual countries could therefore be quite different from those of small arms. 
Sudden and consistent trends in imports of ammunition and parts of ammunition for military firearms can be detected in 
countries that are involved in either internal or international conflicts, such as Colombia and the United States. 
The period 1999—2003 shows relatively stable trading patterns in small arms ammunition. The top ammunition exporters 
(defined as those states whose export value was equal to or above USD 150 million for the period as a whole) were the United 
States, Italy, Belgium, the UK, the Russian Federation, and Germany. For 2003, the top exporters (defined as those states whose 
export value was equal to or above USD 30 million) were the United States, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain.6 The top 
ammunition importers for the five-year period 
are the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Ger-
many, and the top importers for 2003 are the 
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
Data sources on authorized ammunition 
transfers are more limited than those on small 
arms transfers as a whole. National arms 
export reports are as a rule less informative 
on ammunition than on arms: hence the trends 
mentioned above are solely based on UN 
Comtrade data. Customs data, such as that of 
UN Comtrade, is also far from perfect. The 
calculations made here only include categories 
930621 (shotgun cartridges and parts) and 
930630 (small arms ammunition), and mixed 
categories were excluded.7 Thus the trade in 
small arms and light weapons ammunition is 
most likely underestimated. 
Sources: Glatz (2006); NISAT (2006); UN Comtrade (2006)
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Figure 3.1 Worldwide small arms ammunition exports as a 
share of total small arms and light weapons exports as 
reported to UN Comtrade, 1999—2003
Sources: NISAT (2006); UN Comtrade (2006)
Small arms ammunition exports Small arms and light weapons exports
impossible to quantify. Analysis of UN Comtrade data for 2003 and field research on countries not reporting to UN 
Comtrade combined suggests there is insufficient reason to challenge the previous estimate for the total global legal 
trade in small arms and light weapons of USD 4 billion. It is assumed that mirror data captures only a small percentage 
of actual legal trade from major suppliers of small arms and light weapons that do not report exports to UN 
Comtrade, or that report only partial information. This list includes Bulgaria, China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and Singapore. 
As in previous years, trade in small arms ammunition is an important component of the overall trade in small 
arms and light weapons (see Box 3.2). Another major component of the trade is military small arms and light weapons, 
although it is notoriously difficult to estimate its exact share of the trade, as the shotgun and rifle categories may also 
contain misclassified information about some military weapons that are not necessarily small arms and light weapons, 
such as heavy artillery systems (Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena, 2005, pp. 117–19).8 Both the ammunition and military 
weapons components of the total small arms trade are even more important than the figures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
suggest, given the problem of under- and unclear reporting.
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Small arms and light weapons exports
The top small arms and light weapons exporters (exporting at least USD 100 million of small arms and light weapons, 
including parts and ammunition, annually) according to available data and estimates in 2003 were the Russian 
Federation, the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, and China. In Table 3.1, a complete listing of top and major 
exporters (major exporters are defined as countries with yearly sales of more than USD 10 million) is presented. 
Compared to 2002, there are some changes. Belgium was no longer among the top exporters in 2003 after several 
years in this category. This might be due to a reporting problem: for 2003, there was a very large difference between 
Belgian and Saudi Arabian declarations of small arms ammunition transfers (Belgium declared an export of USD 
37,018, while Saudi Arabia declared an import of USD 47,153,180). The reliability calculator favoured Belgium, and 
its declaration is included below. This explains, in no small part, the apparent drop in Belgium’s exports (and Saudi 
imports) compared with 2002. Some other countries appear on the list of major exporters for the first time, namely 
Croatia and Iran, and others, such as Australia and Mexico, reappear after being absent from the 2002 listing. Croatia’s 
main small arms trading partners in 2003 were the United States, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Afghanistan, 
and Dominica. For Iran, they were Sudan and Italy. North Korea was newly included as a medium producer. Apart 
from this, there were no large shifts in major small arms exporters in the period 2001–03.
As in previous years, there are some exporters, presumed to be important in the authorized small arms and light 
weapons trade, about which relatively little is known. These include Bulgaria, China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and Singapore. Finding information on the small arms and light weapons exports 
of these countries is often very difficult. Bulgarian policy, for example, is to keep this information classified.9 
Table 3.1 Annual authorized small arms and light weapons exports for major exporters (yearly sales of more 
than USD 10 million), 2003
Country USD value 
(unless 
otherwise 
stated)
Main recipients 
(top ﬁ ve by 
value)*
Main types of small arms 
and light weapons exported 
(top ﬁ ve). NB: types refer to 
customs codes (see notes)
Remarks
Australia 10 million** US, Japan, New 
Zealand, 
Belgium, UK**
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es**
Department of Defence did not report 
on arms exports in 2003. 
Austria At least 97 
million**
US, Germany, 
Switzerland, 
Russian 
Federation, 
Italy**
Pistols/revolvers, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
pistols/revolvers**
Reports its exports neither of military 
weapons nor of pistols/revolvers to 
UN Comtrade. Hence the value of 
these categories (based on importers’ 
reports) is likely to be underestimated.
Belgium At least 75 
million**
US, Portugal, 
France, UK, 
Italy**
Parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, sporting/
hunting shotguns, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es, ammunition**
Reports its exports neither of military 
weapons nor of pistols/revolvers to 
UN Comtrade. Hence the value for 
these categories (based on 
importers’ reports) is likely to be 
underestimated.
Belgium no longer publishes a 
national arms export report.
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The Region of Brussels presented 
arms export reports for the period 1 
Septem ber 2003—31 December 2004. 
Although information on licences is 
disaggregated among ‘light’,’ semi-
light‘, and ‘heavy weapons’, the report 
only gives information on granted 
export licences and not actual deliveries. 
Values are not broken down by 
weapons category.
The Wallonian Region released a 
report on arms exports for the period 
1 September —31 December 2003. This 
report, however, does not distinguish 
between heavy conventional weapons 
and small arms and light weapons and 
only gives very aggregated information 
concerning export licences and not 
actual exports. 
The report from Flanders covers the 
period 30 August 2003—31 August 2004. 
It provides information on actual 
deliveries disaggregated by weapon 
category, but values for small arms 
and light weapons are not provided 
separately from those for other 
conventional weapons.
Brazil At least 101 
million**
US, Colombia, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Germany, 
Zimbabwe1** 
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
sporting/hunting shotguns**
Does not report exports of pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. However, 
handguns are the main product and 
export good of the Brazilian small arms 
industry. The value for this product is 
based on importers’ reports.2
Bulgaria Medium producer, but little is reported about its exports.
Canada 57 million**
Canadian 
export report 
for 2003 had 
not yet been 
released in 
January 2006.
US, Belgium, 
Denmark, UK, 
Australia**
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
pistols/revolvers, military 
ﬁ rearms**
Customs data and the national report 
diverge largely because the latter does 
not take into account exports to the 
United States, which, according to the 
export report, are ‘estimated to account 
for over half of Canada’s exports of 
military goods and technology’ (Canada, 
2003, p. 7).
China At least 14 
million**
Small Arms 
Survey estimate: 
USD 100 million 
(Small Arms 
Survey, 2004, 
Annexe 4.1)
US, Bangladesh, 
Germany, Canada, 
Malta**
Sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, parts/
accessories pistols/revolvers, 
pistols/revolvers**
Customs data is likely to underestimate 
actual exports, as China does not 
report on many of its exports, and 
hence ﬁ gures are based on importers’ 
reporting.
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Croatia 13 million** US, Macedonia, 
Serbia and 
Montenegro, 
Afghanistan, 
Dominica**
Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
military ﬁ rearms, rocket/
grenade launchers, parts/
accessories pistols/
revolvers**
Czech 
Republic
At least 51 
million**
EUR 25.5 million 
(USD 30.8 
million)♣
US, Germany, 
France, Colombia, 
Slovakia**
Sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
parts/accessories pistols/
revolvers**
Does not report exports of military 
weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on importers’ reports) is 
likely to be underestimated. Customs 
and export report data diverge 
probably largely because small arms 
ammunition cannot be distinguished 
from other types of ammunition in 
the arms export report. The report 
does not rank recipients for all types 
of small arms.
Finland 32 million**
EUR 2.3 million 
(USD 2.8 
million)♣
US, Sweden, 
Norway, UK, 
Italy**
Italy, US, 
Germany, UK, 
Czech Republic♣
Sporting/hunting riﬂ es, ammu-
nition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
military ﬁ rearms, sporting/
hunting shotguns**
Customs and export report data 
diverge probably largely because 
civilian weapons are excluded from 
the export report. Moreover, in the 
export report, small arms ammunition 
cannot be distinguished from other 
types of ammunition.
France At least 42 
million**
EUR 47.2 
million3 (USD 
57.1 million)♣
Côte d’Ivoire,4 
Turkey, US, 
Portugal, 
Canada**
Oman, Norway, 
Tunisia, South 
Korea, Spain♣ 
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
military weapons, ammunition, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons**
Does not report exports of military 
weapons and pistols/revolvers to UN 
Comtrade. Hence the value (based on 
importers’ reports) is likely to be 
underestimated. Customs and export 
report data capture different parts 
of the small arms and light weapons 
trade: customs data better captures 
small arms and civilian weapons, 
while the arms export report 
encompasses more high-end light 
weapons. 
Germany At least 201 
million**
US, France, 
Austria, 
Switzerland, 
Japan**
Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, parts/accessories 
pistols/revolvers**
Does not report exports of military 
weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on importers’ reports) is 
likely to be underestimated.
Publishes an export report, but it 
includes information on granted 
export licences, not actual deliveries 
of small arms and light weapons, 
which may be lower.
Iran At least 16 
million**
Sudan, Italy** Military weapons, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, ammunition, pistols/
revolvers, parts/accessories 
pistols/revolvers**
Does not report on its small arms and 
light weapons exports at all to UN 
Comtrade. Figures are based on 
importers’ reports. Hence the value is 
likely to be underestimated.
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Israel At least 15 
million**
US, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Germany, 
Austria**
Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
parts/accessories pistols/
revolvers, military ﬁ rearms, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons**
Does not report on its small arms and 
light weapons exports at all to UN 
Comtrade. Figures are based on 
importers’ reports. Hence the value is 
likely to be underestimated.
Italy At least 347 
million** 
529,615♣5
US, France, UK, 
Spain, Germany**
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, pistols/revolvers, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons**
Does not report exports of military 
weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on importers’ reports) is 
likely to be underestimated.
Publishes an export report, but it 
includes information provided by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on granted 
licences of military weapons, not actual 
deliveries of small arms and light 
weapons, which may be lower. The 
report includes an annexe with some 
information from the Customs Agency 
(Agenzia delle Dogane) on actual 
exports of military small arms. 
Information is provided in this annexe 
by company, product, and value. It is 
not possible, however, to identify the 
countries of destination of small arms 
and light weapons exports (Italy, 2004, 
pp. 169—96)
Japan 72 million** US, Belgium, 
Canada, 
Germany**
Sporting/hunting riﬂ es, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, shotgun barrels, 
rocket/grenade launchers**
Mexico 11 million** US, Honduras, 
Peru, Guatemala, 
Panama**
Shotgun barrels, ammunition, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, military 
ﬁ rearms**
Exports of military ﬁ rearms might 
actually be returns for repairs or 
devolution of material to the licensing 
company, Heckler & Koch. Germany 
ranks as the sixth importer from Mexico 
and is the only country that received 
military ﬁ rearms from that country.6
North Korea Medium producer, but little is reported about its exports.
Norway 73 million**7 Spain, Sweden, 
Italy, Switzerland, 
UK**
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
rocket/grenade launchers, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es**
Publishes national arms export report, 
but in the edition covering 2003, it is 
difﬁ cult to distinguish the small arms 
and light weapons share of arms 
exports.
Pakistan Medium producer, but little is reported about its exports. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
it delivered Anza-2 portable surface-to-air missiles to Malaysia between 2002 and 2003 (SIPRI, 2006).
Portugal 17 million** Belgium, US, Spain, 
Guinea Bissau, 
Germany**
Sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, pistols/
revolvers, ammunition**
Publishes an export report, but it does 
not detail the share of small arms and 
light weapons in total arms exports.
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Romania Medium producer, but little is reported about its exports.
Russian 
Federation
At least 43 
million**
At least 431.8 
million (410.3 
million for small 
arms and light 
weapons and 
21.5 million for 
small arms and 
light weapons 
ammunition) 
(Pyadushkin, 
2005, pp. 1—2)♠
US, Cyprus, 
France, Algeria, 
Kazakhstan**
Jordan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Kenya 
(Pyadushkin, 
2005, p. 3)♠
India, Indonesia 
(SIPRI, 2006)♦ 
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, military ﬁ rearms, 
pistols/revolvers**
Rocket-propelled grenade 
launchers, assault riﬂ es 
(Pyadushkin, 2005, p. 3)8♠
MANPADS (SIPRI, 2006)♦
Customs data is likely to underesti-
mate actual exports, as the Russian 
Federation does not report on many 
of its exports, and hence ﬁ gures are 
based on importers’ reporting.
Singapore Medium producer, but little is reported about its exports.
South 
Africa
At least 18 
million**
Namibia, Colombia, 
US, UK, Brasil**
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
pistols/revolvers, rocket/
grenade launchers, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es**
Does not report on its small arms and 
light weapons exports at all to UN 
Comtrade. Figures are based on 
importers’ reports. Hence the value is 
likely to be underestimated.
South Africa no longer makes its arms 
export report public (Honey, 2005).
South 
Korea
23 million** US, Venezuela, 
Indonesia, 
Australia, 
Thailand**
Ammunition, parts/accessories 
pistols/revolvers, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, military ﬁ rearms**
Spain At least 
55 million** 
EUR 5.9 million 
(USD 7.1 
million)♣
US, UK, Portugal, 
Ghana, France**
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es**
Does not report exports of military 
weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on importers’ reports) is 
likely to be underestimated.
The discrepancy between the arms 
export report ﬁ gure and the UN 
Comtrade ﬁ gure is most likely due to 
the fact that civilian weapons are 
excluded from the export report.
Export report does not detail recipients 
of small arms.
Sweden At least 
29 million**
SEK 19 million 
(USD 2.5 
million)♣
US, Norway, 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Mexico**
Pakistan, 
Thailand, 
Australia (SIPRI, 
2006)♦
Ammunition, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, sporting/hunting 
shotguns**
MANPADS (SIPRI, 2006)♦
Does not report exports of military 
weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on importers’ reports) is 
likely to be underestimated.
Customs and export report data diverge 
probably largely because small arms 
ammunition cannot be distinguished 
from other types of ammunition in the 
arms export report. In the export report, 
it is also difﬁ cult to fully distinguish 
small arms and light weapons from 
other items. The export report does 
not detail recipients of small arms.
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Switzerland 65 million**
CHF 14.1 million 
(USD 11 
million)♣
Germany, US, 
Austria, Finland, 
United Arab 
Emirates**
Germany, US, 
Poland, Italy, 
Macau (China)♣
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
military ﬁ rearms, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons**
Customs and export report data diverge 
probably largely because small arms 
ammunition cannot be distinguished 
from other types of ammunition in the 
arms export report. In the export report, 
it is also difﬁ cult to fully distinguish 
small arms and light weapons from 
other items. Civilian weapons are 
excluded from the export report.
Turkey 56 million** Germany, US, 
Italy, Austria, 
Egypt**
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, shot gun 
barrels**
UK 42 million** US, Japan, 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Switzerland**
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es**
Publishes export report, but does not 
detail the value of small arms and 
light weapons exports. Instead it 
provides numbers of certain types of 
small arms and light weapons exported 
and certain destinations. 
US 370 million** Japan, Canada, 
South Korea, 
United Arab 
Emirates, 
Australia**
Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Egypt (SIPRI, 
2006)♦
Ammunition, military ﬁ rearms, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, rocket/
grenade launchers, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es**
MANPADS (SIPRI, 2006)♦
Publishes export report, but it includes 
mostly information on granted export 
licences, not actual deliveries of small 
arms and light weapons, which may 
be lower.
* Excluding those contributing less than 1% of the total.
** NISAT (2006); UN Comtrade (2006). Customs codes: 9301 (military weapons), 930120 (rocket and grenade launchers, etc.), 930190 (military firearms), 
9302 (revolvers and pistols), 930320 (sporting and hunting shotguns), 930330 (sporting and hunting rifles), 930510 (parts and accessories of revolvers and 
pistols), 930521 (shotgun barrels), 930529 (parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles), 930621 (shotgun cartridges), 930630 (small arms ammunition).
♣ Export report.
♠
 Report by field researcher.
♦ Other academic/research sources such as SIPRI.
Note 1: Customs data and national arms export reports diverge for a number of reasons. Two important causes for discrepancies are: (a) unlike customs 
data, national arms export reports mostly do not include exports of whatever is categorized as ‘civilian’ weapons; and (b) many countries use the 
Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (ML) in their arms export reports. The categories of the ML list, with one exception (ML1), do not distinguish 
small arms and light weapons from other types of weapons. The Small Arms Survey records the ML1 value in the table; hence many types of small arms 
and light weapons, and all types of small arms ammunition, are excluded. For further details, see Small Arms Survey (2005, pp. 101—02).
Note 2: Some top producers of small arms, e.g. China and the Russian Federation, do not publish any arms export reports and only limited customs 
information. In order to properly reflect their presumed importance in the small arms trade, the Small Arms Survey goes beyond mirror data. China 
is stil l  estimated to export USD 100 million worth of small arms and light weapons. For details, see Small Arms Survey (2004, ch. 4, Annexe 4.1). For 
the Russian Federation, figures were developed on the basis of field research. 
Note 3: In this table, ‘transfer’ can also mean the movement of small arms for repair, and devolution of parts and weapons to licensing companies. 
NB 1: ‘Ammunition’ in the table refers to shotgun cartridges and small arms ammunition combined.
NB 2: Category 9301 (military weapons) is a mixed category, containing both small arms and light weapons and other weapons. It was replaced by four 
new categories in the newest revision of the UN Comtrade Harmonized System (HS 2002), facilitating differentiation between small arms and light 
weapons and other weapons, among them the small arms and light weapons categories 930120 and 930190. Some countries still use HS 1996, however, 
and their reported value for 93010 may therefore include military weapons other than small arms and light weapons. The calculations on which this 
table is based include data from HS 2002, HS 1996, and HS 1992 to account for all transfers of military small arms and light weapons reported to UN 
Comtrade. For the older HS codes, the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register) or the SIPRI Yearbook  were consulted to see whether any of 
the transfers were likely to concern large-calibre artillery. This was not the case for any transfers during 2003 (otherwise the respective 9301 value 
would have been taken out of the calculation). For more information on revisions of the UN Comtrade HS, see Marsh (2005).
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1 Brazil declares exports to Zimbabwe.
2 Research by Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena (2005, p. 116) suggests that Brazil records its firearm exports in a somewhat unorthodox way, fil ing its 
pistols and revolvers exports under customs category 930330 (sporting and hunting rifles). The imports declared in category 9302 (revolvers and 
pistols) by the United States may thus correspond to inflated figures in the category 930330 on the Brazilian side.
3 Calculated from France (2005, Annexe 15).
4 In a phone conversation with the Small Arms Survey on 1 December 2005, an official from the French Mission in Geneva suggested that the small arms 
and light weapons declared by Côte d’Ivoire may be related to the transfer of French equipment to France’s ‘Operation Licorne’, which was supporting 
the Economic Community of West Africa States peacekeeping mission in that country at the time.
5 This figure only includes military small arms and light weapons (including parts and ammunition) as reported by the Customs Agency in the national 
arms export report.
6 On small arms production under Heckler & Koch licence in Mexico, see Small Arms Survey (2004, p. 25).
7 The majority of Norwegian exports to Spain were destined for ships being built in Spain for the Norwegian Navy (e-mail communication with Nicholas 
Marsh, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 27 February 2006).
8 Types of small arms and light weapons exported to the top three recipients.
Sources: Brussels (2005); Canada (2003); Czech Republic (2004); Finland (2004); Flanders (n.d.); France (2005); Germany (2004); Italy (2004); NISAT 
(2006) (UN Comtrade calculations); Norway (2004); Pyadushkin (2005); South Africa (2003); Spain (2004); Sweden (2004); Switzerland (2004); Wallonia 
(2004); UK (2004) 
Small arms and light weapons imports
The top importers (i.e. countries importing more than USD 100 million worth of small arms and light weapons in a 
given year) for 2003 were the United States, Cyprus, and Germany. In 2002 the list was somewhat different, comprising 
the United States, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Similarly, there are a number of changes in the listing of 
major importers (i.e. those states that import more than USD 10 million of small arms and light weapons) from 2002 
to 2003. Bahrain, Jordan, Kenya, and the Philippines are no longer among the major importers. Newcomers here are 
Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Namibia, New Zealand, Sudan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
Listings of top and major small arms and light weapons importers are normally more volatile than a similar list of 
exporters. Only the United States and Cyprus regularly rate as top importers.10 While civilian demand (and hence 
international purchases of civilian weapons) more rarely undergoes drastic changes from one year to the next, pro-
curement decisions of police and the military are more prone to fluctuations, especially in smaller states. For some 
countries, explanations for sudden drops in imports have to be sought elsewhere, however. Saudi Arabia no longer 
reports on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers, which probably explains the apparent drastic fall 
of imports of that country (from USD 132 million in 2002 to only USD 25 million in 2003).
Just as with exporters, information on some countries that are presumed to be major importers remains scarce. 
This is particularly true for countries in conflict, be it internal or international (although Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Israel, the Russian Federation, and Sudan are among the major importers listed in Table 3.2). In some cases, imports to 
such countries (and especially to insurgents) are illicit and thus do not fit into Table 3.2. Transfers to some war zones 
are discussed in more detail in the case study chapters of this volume.11
Other presumed major importers that are not found in Table 3.2 are post-war states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Under UN arms embargo until 2004, Iraq’s imports gathered pace in that year and 2005. Suppliers of small arms to 
Iraq include Central and Eastern European countries, e.g. Estonia and Romania, as well as Western countries such as 
Denmark and the United States (Associated Press, 2005; NATO, 2005; US Central Command, 2004). Afghanistan has 
also relied on Central and Eastern European suppliers (Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) and the United States 
in the post-conflict period (Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation, 2005; Ramon, 2004; Associated Press, 2002). Most of 
the supplies to both countries consist of donations, and hence are not captured by information based on values such 
as those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
For 2003, the top 
importers were the 
United States, 
Cyprus, and Germany.
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Table 3.2 Annual authorized small arms and light weapons imports for major importers (yearly imports of 
more than USD 10 million), 2003
Country USD value 
customs 
data (UN 
Comtrade)
Main suppliers 
(top ﬁ ve)*
Main types of small arms 
and light weapons imported 
(top ﬁ ve). NB: types refer to 
customs codes (see notes)
Remarks
Australia 42 million US, unspeciﬁ ed 
countries, Italy, 
Austria, Finland
Ammunition, military ﬁ rearms, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, pistols/
revolvers, sporting/hunting 
shotguns
Austria At least 27 
million
Germany, 
Switzerland, 
Turkey, Italy, 
Belgium 
Ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, sporting/
hunting shotguns, parts/
accessories pistols/revolvers
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value is possibly underestimated.
Belgium At least 37 
million
Japan, Portugal, 
US, Italy, Canada
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, pistols/revolvers
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on exporters’ reports) is 
possibly underestimated. Some 
imports might actually be returns for 
repairs.
Canada 58 million US, Italy, Japan, 
Germany, UK
Ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
sporting/hunting shotguns
Colombia 34 million Brazil, US, South 
Africa, Czech 
Republic, Germany 
Ammunition, military ﬁ rearms, 
pistols/revolvers, rocket/
grenade launchers
Côte d’Ivoire 11 million France1 Military weapons, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Does not report on many of its 
imports. Hence the value is possibly 
underestimated.
Cyprus 185 million Unspeciﬁ ed 
countries, Russian 
Federation
Military ﬁ rearms, sporting/
hunting shotguns, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Czech Republic 11 million Italy, Germany, 
US, Turkey, 
Austria
Pistols/revolvers, parts/
accessories pistols/revolvers, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting shotguns 
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value is possibly underestimated.
Denmark 22 million Germany, Italy, 
Canada, Sweden, 
UK
Ammunition, sporting/ hunting 
riﬂ es, sporting/hunting 
shot guns, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons 
Egypt 17 million US, Turkey, 
Czech Republic
Parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
pistols/revolvers, rocket/
grenade launchers
76 SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006
Finland 17 million Italy, Switzerland, 
Germany, US, 
Austria
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, sporting/ hunting 
riﬂ es, military ﬁ rearms 
France At least 83 
million
Italy, Germany, 
Belgium, US, 
Spain
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value is possibly underestimated.
Germany At least 109 
million
Switzerland, 
Turkey, Italy, US, 
Austria
Ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value is possibly underestimated.
Greece At least 13 
million
Italy, US, Germany, 
Spain, Russian 
Federation
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
rocket/grenade launchers, 
shotgun barrels
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on exporters’ reports) is 
possibly underestimated.
Israel At least 16 
million
US, Austria,2 
South Korea, 
Czech Republic
Ammunition, military ﬁ rearms, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, parts/
accessories pistols/revolvers, 
pistols/revolvers
Does not report any imports to UN 
Comtrade. Hence the value (based on 
exporters’ reports) is probably 
underestimated.
Italy At least 48 
million
US, Germany, 
Belgium, Turkey, 
Norway 
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
pistols/revolvers, sporting/
hunting shotguns
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value is possibly underestimated.
Japan 64 million US, Germany, 
Italy, UK, Australia
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
pistols/revolvers, sporting/
hunting shotguns 
Kuwait At least 14 
million
US, Italy, Germany, 
France, Portugal
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, military ﬁ rearms, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Does not report any imports to UN 
Comtrade. Hence the value (based on 
exporters’ reports) is probably 
underestimated.
Malaysia 10 million US, Switzerland, 
Italy, Norway, 
Netherlands
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, rocket/grenade launchers, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons
Mexico 15 million Italy, US, Israel, 
Austria, Sweden
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
military ﬁ rearms, rocket/
grenade launchers, sporting/
hunting shotguns
Namibia 10 million South Africa, 
Germany, Czech 
Republic, Spain, 
US
Military ﬁ rearms, pistols/
revolvers, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, ammunition
Netherlands At least 23 
million
US, Germany, 
Belgium, 
Switzerland, 
Canada
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, sporting/
hunting shotguns 
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on exporters’ reports) is 
possibly underestimated.
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New Zealand 14 million US, Italy, Australia, 
Switzerland, 
Canada
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons 
Norway 30 million Germany, US, 
Italy, Sweden, 
Finland
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, military ﬁ rearms
Poland 13 million Germany, Italy, 
Czech Republic, 
Russian 
Federation, 
Switzerland
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
parts/accessories pistols/
revolvers, military ﬁ rearms, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Portugal 40 million Belgium, Italy, 
US, Spain, France
Parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons, sporting/
hunting shotguns, parts/
accessories pistols/revolvers, 
shotgun barrels, ammunition
Russian 
Federation
At least 15 
million
Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Belgium, 
France
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, ammunition
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons, revolvers/pistols, and 
ammunition to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value (based on exporters’ 
reports) is possibly underestimated.
Saudi Arabia At least 25 
million
Brazil, US, 
Germany, 
Switzerland, UK
Ammunition, parts/accessories 
sporting/hunting weapons, 
rocket/grenade launchers, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es 
Does not report on its imports of 
military weapons and pistols/
revolvers to UN Comtrade. Hence the 
value (based on exporters’ reports) is 
possibly underestimated.
South Korea 42 million US, Italy, UK, 
Germany 
Ammunition, rocket/grenade 
launchers, pistols/revolvers, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons 
Spain At least 99 
million
Norway, Italy, 
Germany, US, 
Portugal
Military ﬁ rearms, sporting/
hunting shotguns, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es, ammunition, 
pistols/revolvers 
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value (based on exporters’ 
reports) is possibly underestimated.
Sudan 18 million Iran, China Military weapons, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons, pistols/revolvers, 
sporting/hunting shotguns, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es
Sweden At least 24 
million
Norway, Germany, 
Finland, US, Italy 
Ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, sporting/hunting 
shotguns, pistols/revolvers, 
parts/accessories sporting/
hunting weapons
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value is possibly underestimated.
Switzerland 24 million Germany, Austria, 
Norway, Italy, UK
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, sporting/
hunting shotguns, parts/
accessories sporting/hunting 
weapons
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Thailand At least 10 
million
US, Austria, 
Czech Republic, 
Germany, Italy
Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, 
sporting/hunting shotguns
Does not report on its imports of mili-
tary weapons to UN Comtrade. Hence 
the value is possibly underestimated.
Turkey 32 million France, US, Italy, 
Spain, Germany
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
rocket/grenade launchers, 
pistols/revolvers
United Arab 
Emirates
At least 42 
million
US, Switzerland, 
Germany, Brazil, 
Finland
Military ﬁ rearms, ammunition, 
pistols/revolvers, sporting/
hunting riﬂ es 
Does not report any imports to UN 
Comtrade. Hence the value (based on 
exporters’ reports) is probably 
underestimated.
UK 77 million Italy, US, 
Germany, 
Belgium, Spain
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
ammunition, sporting/hunting 
riﬂ es, parts/accessories hunting/
sporting weapons
US 623 million Italy, Germany, 
Austria, Japan 
Brazil
Sporting/hunting shotguns, 
pistols/revolvers, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting riﬂ es, parts/
accessories hunting/sporting 
weapons
Venezuela 10 million South Korea, 
Brazil, Italy, 
Spain, Austria
Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, 
parts/accessories pistols/
revolvers, sporting/hunting 
shotguns 
* Excluding those contributing less than 1% of the total. 
Note 1:  Includes customs codes 9301 (military weapons), 930120 (rocket and grenade launchers, etc.), 930190 (military firearms), 9302 (revolvers 
and pistols), 930320 (sporting and hunting shotguns), 930330 (sporting and hunting rifles), 930510 (parts and accessories of revolvers and pistols), 
930521 (shotgun barrels), 930529 (parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles), 930621 (shotgun cartridges), 930630 (small arms ammunition). 
Note 2: For the scope of this table, ‘transfer’ can also mean the movement of small arms for repair, and the devolution of parts and weapons to 
licensing companies. 
NB 1:  ‘Ammunition’ in the table refers to shotgun cartridges and small arms ammunition combined.
NB 2:  Category 9301 (military weapons) is a mixed category, containing small arms and light weapons as well as other weapons. It was replaced by 
four new categories in the newest revision of the UN Comtrade Harmonized System (HS 2002), facilitating differentiation between small arms and 
light weapons and other weapons, among them the small arms and light weapons categories 930120 and 930190. Some countries still  use HS 1996, 
however, and their reported value for 93010 may therefore include military weapons other than small arms and light weapons. The calculations on 
which this table is based include data from HS 2002, HS 1996, and HS 1992, to account for all transfers of military small arms and light weapons 
reported to UN Comtrade. For the older HSs, it was checked whether corresponding conventional arms transfers were reported in the UN Register or 
the SIPRI Yearbook. This was not the case for any country for 2003 (otherwise the respective 93010 value would have been taken out of the calculation). 
For more information on revisions of the UN Comtrade Harmonized System, see Small Arms Survey (2005, pp. 99–100, Box 4.1) and Marsh (2005).
1 For Côte d’Ivoire’s imports from France, which may have been transfers to ‘Operation Licorne’, see Table 3.1, n. 4.
2 It is registered in UN Comtrade as Austrian exports of category 930510 (parts and accessories of revolvers and pistols). This information is not, however, 
mirrored by Israel.
Sources: NISAT (2006); UN Comtrade (2006) 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSPARENCY: ANNUAL UPDATE
General trends in international transparency
The small arms and light weapons transparency device that received great attention by governments, NGOs, and other 
actors during 2005—and will probably continue to do so in 2006—is states’ reporting on their implementation of the 
UN Programme of Action (Programme). These reports can be very useful for understanding legislative developments 
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and practices regarding stockpile security, marking and tracing, collection and destruction of surplus small arms, and 
other issues.12 However, they rarely contain any information on small arms imports and exports, as this is outside the 
scope of the information exchange. The transparency mechanisms on small arms transfers thus remain basically the 
same as in previous years.13
The UN Register (UN, 2006a) is now in its second year of reporting on certain types of light weapons (artillery 
pieces between 75 and 100 mm, including MANPADS) (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 109). The voluntary sharing of 
information on all types of military small arms and light weapons is also continuing, and that information is now 
available on the Web site of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN, 2006b). The Small Arms Survey 2005 
examined mainly the number and geographical spread of countries reporting to the UN Register during the first year 
(2003). But how useful is the format of the reporting for better understanding light weapons transfers? So far, for 
export and import figures, few states have provided the kind of detail necessary to single out mortars falling into the 
category of light weapons from other types of artillery, and MANPADS from other types of missiles. So although some 
light weapons are now part of the reporting of a number of countries, it is difficult to gain a good understanding of the 
trade in mortars and MANPADS from the UN Register. As there is no agreed-upon format for the voluntary sharing of 
information on military small arms and light weapons, the reporting varies widely among different states, and between 
this reporting and other types of reporting. The case of France is very illustrative here. The French national arms export 
report is very informative and detailed concerning exports of grenade launchers, light anti-tank weapons, and MANPADS 
(France, 2005, p. 67 and Annexe 15). However, France does not report these exports to the UN Register.
The annual reports on the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports—which contain data on 
arms exports from European Union (EU) countries—have become more substantive in recent years. The first report, 
published in 1999, was of little utility in understanding small arms transfers from EU member states. By the sixth report, 
published in December 2004, the reporting format had evolved considerably (EU, 2004). It now contains data disag-
gregated by country and weapon type (using the EU Common Military List categories, very similar to the Wassenaar 
ML). A major weakness of the reporting (apart from the fact that those countries that do not publish national arms 
export reports also for the most part do not provide detailed information to the annual EU report) is that the weapons 
categorization used makes it difficult to fully distinguish small arms and light weapons from other types of weapons 
(see Table 3.1, Note 1). Furthermore, it only provides data on licences granted, not actual deliveries. Nevertheless, 
Box 3.3 Ups and downs in transparency: Belgium and South Africa
In previous years, the Small Arms Survey has noted some positive developments in state transparency, such as new countries 
starting to publish annual arms export reports. This trend continues (e.g. in February 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a 
first report on its arms exports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005)). There are also states moving in the opposite direction, however.
One of the more peculiar cases is Belgium, which regionalized and decentralized its export controls, including reporting on 
arms exports, in 2003. So far, reporting from the three Belgian regions has been sketchy, at best. Furthermore, there is no 
federal-level effort to coordinate or assemble the information on arms exports from the regions. All this means that Belgium 
has effectively discontinued its annual arms export reporting, and the only national governmental source of information on 
Belgian small arms exports is now customs data.
In South Africa, a number of arms transactions (most of which did not include small arms) have come under intense public 
scrutiny and debate in the last years. In 2005 the South African government decided to stop the practice of making the national 
arms export report public (Honey, 2005). 
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the EU report is very important, as any impetus for improvement in reporting formats, in particular on small arms and 
light weapons, in this forum would have an impact on many exporting states. This is also one reason why the NGO 
community carefully scrutinizes the report every year.14 
Update on the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer
One means to encourage states to provide more data on their small arms and light weapons exports is the Small 
Arms Trade Transparency Barometer. The Barometer assesses information that states provide in two formats: national 
arms export reports and customs data (as reported to UN Comtrade). The information is analysed from a number of 
angles, taking into account how accessible, clear, and comprehensive it is. The details states provide on licences and 
deliveries of small arms and light weapons are also assessed.
This year, the Barometer has been slightly revised to include four new or extended parameters: (a) the timeliness 
of reporting; (b) whether detailed weapon descriptions are provided (i.e. if there is a differentiation among sub-
categories of small arms and light weapons such as pistols/revolvers, sniper rifles, shotguns, machine guns, etc.); (c) 
whether information on small arms and light weapons ammunition is included; and (d) whether reporting covers 
both civilian and military small arms (maximum 2 points instead of 1 point previously). The new maximum score is 25.
Details on the scoring system are provided beneath Table 3.3. States are awarded points for information on 
granted and denied licences only if the value of the licence and/or the quantity of weapons included in the licence 
are/is specified. This means that statistics on mere numbers of licences are not awarded points. The reason is that 
such information says little about the scale of the proposed transaction—are a couple of guns or several thousands 
of them involved? The same is true for deliveries, where, again, information on numbers of shipments (rather than 
numbers of weapons delivered or their value) does not improve states’ scores.
The Barometer evaluates the quantity and level of detail of the data made public, but does not assess the accuracy 
of the information states provide. This is simply beyond the means (in terms of access and resources) of independent, 
internationally based researchers. It is well known, however, that there are problems of inconsistencies among 
various reporting formats. Table 3.1 illustrates this extensively and gives some explanations as to why inconsistencies 
can occur (see Table 3.1, Note 1). Regular revelations in the press of contested and at times secretive arms transfers 
are also indications that national arms export reports are not always exhaustive.
The Barometer focuses on small arms and light weapons only, and uniquely on those states that are important 
in the small arms and light weapons trade. It cannot therefore be used as a measure of how transparent states are 
on their arms exports as a whole (i.e. of all conventional weapons, dual use goods, etc.). 
What conclusions can be drawn from the Barometer? At the top of the list are the United States and Germany, 
and at the bottom, Bulgaria, Iran, Israel, and North Korea (all with zero scores). This state of affairs remains relatively 
similar to previous years. States are generally better at providing information in certain categories, such as availability 
on the Internet, availability in a UN language, source information, summaries of export laws and international com-
mitments, and information on values of deliveries. States seem particularly unwilling to provide any data on the 
intended end-users of small arms, government-sourced transactions (which often, although not always, concern 
older weapons from state stockpiles), licence denials, and, albeit to a lesser extent, licence approvals. Timeliness of 
reporting also remains a serious problem in many cases.
The most transparent 
states in the 2006 
Barometer are the 
United States and 
Germany.
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Table 3.3 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, covering major exporters
Country and 
source(s) available
Total 
points
(25 
points 
max.)
Timeliness 
(2 points 
max.)
Access 
(2 
points 
max.)
Clarity
(5 
points 
max.)
Comprehen-
siveness
(6 points 
max.)
Information 
on deliveries
(4 points 
max.)
Information 
on licences 
granted
(4 points 
max.)
Information 
on licences 
refused 
(2 points 
max.)
Australia1 E (01–02) C 14.5 0.5 2 2.5 5.5 4 0 0
Austria C 9.5 0 1.5 2.5 3.5 2 0 0
Belgium2 C 9 0 1.5 2.5 3 2 0 0
Brazil C 10 0 1.5 2.5 4 2 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada1 E (02) C 16.5 0.5 2 4 6 4 0 0
China3 C 10.5 0 1.5 2.5 2.5 4 0 0
Czech Republic 
E (04) C
16 1 2 3 5 3 2 0
Croatia C 10 0 1.5 2.5 4 2 0 0
Finland E (03) C 16 1 2 3 6 2 2 0
France4 E (04) C 16.5 1 2 3.5 6 4 0 0
Germany5 E (04) C 19 1 2 3.5 6 2 4 0.5
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy E (04) C 17 2 2 3 5 3 2 0
Japan C 11 0 1.5 2.5 5 2 0 0
Mexico C 9 0 1.5 2.5 3 2 0 0
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway E (04) C 15 2 2 3 6 2 0 0
Pakistan3 C 11 0 1.5 2.5 3 4 0 0
Portugal E (03) C 11 0.5 2 2.5 4 2 0 0
Romania E (02) 4.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1 1 0 0
Russian Federation C 7.5 0 1.5 2.5 1.5 2 0 0
Singapore3 C 9.5 0 1.5 2.5 1.5 4 0 0
South Africa 
E (00–02)
1.5 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea C 10 0 1.5 2.5 4 2 0 0
Spain6 E (04) C 16 1 2 3.5 6 2.5 1 0
Sweden E (04) C 15 2 2 3 6 2 0 0
Switzerland E (04) C 14 1.5 2 3 5 2 0 0.5
Turkey C 10.5 0 1.5 2.5 4.5 2 0 0
UK7 E (04) C 15 2 2 3 6 2 0 0
US8 E (04) C 20.5 2 2 3.5 5 4 4 0
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E = Export report with year of reporting. 
C = Customs data.
Scoring system
(a) Timeliness (2 points total, score based on national arms export reports data only): A report has been published within the last 24 months (up to 31 
January 2006) (0.5 points); information is available in a timely fashion (1 point if within 6 months of the end of the year in question, 0.5 if within a year).
(b) Access (2 points total): Information is: available on Internet through UN Comtrade (1 point); available in a UN language (0.5 points); free of 
charge (0.5 points).
(c)  Clarity (5 points total): The reporting includes source information (1 point); small arms and light weapons distinguishable from other types of 
weapons (1 point); small arms and light weapons ammunition distinguishable from other types of ammunition (1 point); detailed weapons description 
included (1 point); reporting includes information on types of end-users (military, police, other security forces, civilians, civilian retailers) (1 point).
(d) Comprehensiveness (6 points total): The reporting covers: government-sourced as well as industry-sourced transactions (1 point); civilian and 
military small arms and light weapons (2 points); information on small arms and light weapons parts (1 point); information on small arms and light 
weapons ammunition (1 point); summaries of export laws and regulations, and international commitments (1 point).
(e) Information on deliveries (4 points total): Data disaggregated by weapons type (value of weapons shipped [1 point], quantity of weapons shipped 
[1 point]), and by country and weapons type (value of weapons shipped [1 point], quantity of weapons shipped [1 point]). 
(f) Information on licences granted (4 points total): Data disaggregated by weapons type (value of weapons licensed [1 point], quantity of weapons 
licensed [1 point]), and by country and weapons type (value of weapons licensed [1 point], quantity of weapons licensed [1 point]).
(g) Information on licences refused (2 points total): Data disaggregated by weapons type (value of licence refused [0.5 points], quantity of weapons 
under refused licence [0.5 points]), and by country and weapons type (value of licence refused [0.5 points], quantity of weapons under refused 
licence [0.5 points]).
Note 1: The Barometer is based on each country’s most recent arms exports that were publicly available as of March 2006 and/or on 2003 customs 
data from UN Comtrade.
Note 2:  Under (d), (e), and (f), no points are granted for number of shipments or number of licences granted or denied, as such figures give little 
information about the magnitude of the trade. The data is disaggregated by weapons type if the share of small arms and light weapons in the country’s 
total arms trade is delineated (x per cent of the total value of the arms exports consisted of small arms and light weapons; x number of small arms 
and light weapons were exported in total). The data is disaggregated both by country and by weapons type if there is information on the types of 
weapons that are transferred to individual recipient states (x numbers/x USD worth of small arms was delivered to country y).
Note 3: Under (d), (e), and (f), ‘weapons type’ means broader weapons categories (that is, ‘small arms’ as opposed to ‘armoured vehicles’ or ‘air-
to-air missiles’), not specific weapons descriptions (‘assault rifles’ as opposed to ‘hunting rifles’).
Note 4: The fact that the Barometer is based on two sources—customs data (as reported to UN Comtrade) and national arms export reports—works 
to the advantage of states that publish data in both forms, since what they do not provide in one form of reporting they might provide in the other. 
Points achieved from each source of the two sources are added up. However, points are obviously not counted twice (e.g. if a country provides both 
customs data and export reports in a UN language, it gets 1 point for this under access, not more).
Note 5:  The scores of the 2005 and 2006 Barometers are not comparable, due to changes in the scoring system between the two years.
1 Australia and Canada receive full score on deliveries, as they are among the few countries that provide information to UN Comtrade on numbers of 
small arms transferred in most categories (Australia: except parts/accessories of revolvers/pistols, shotgun barrels, and parts/accessories of sport-
ing/hunting weapons; Canada: except parts/accessories of revolvers/pistols, shotgun barrels, parts/accessories of sporting/hunting weapons, and 
ammunition).
2 Belgium has not published any national arms export report since 2002 because export control was regionalized in September 2003 (for details, see 
Wallonia, 2004, pp. 3—12). This means that each Belgian region in principle reports separately on its arms exports, but so far practice in this respect 
has been sketchy at best (for further details, see Box 3.3). The score is therefore based on customs data submissions only.
3 China, Pakistan, and Singapore all receive full score on deliveries, as they are among the few countries that provide information to UN Comtrade on 
numbers of small arms transferred. This makes their total scores larger than would otherwise be warranted.
4 France receives full score on deliveries, although it should be stressed that deliveries of quantities (as opposed to values) are provided for a four-
year period, rather than yearly (France, 2005, p. 67). France gives details of orders [‘prises de commande’], which are defined as ‘contracts signed 
and entered into force through a first down-payment during the year under consideration’ (France, 2005, p. 54, authors’ translation). Orders are not 
equivalent to licences, and therefore no points are given in the columns pertaining to licences granted and denied.
5 Germany provides more detailed information on licences granted and denied for main trading partners and so-called ‘third countries’, i.e. countries 
outside the circle of the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and NATO-equivalent countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland). It has been awarded full points on the relevant criteria nevertheless.
6 Spain makes public its report on small arms and light weapons exports to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as an annex 
to its arms export report. The report contains information both on licences granted (volumes by country and weapons type) and on actual deliveries 
(also volumes by country and weapons type). It covers only the OSCE states, and hence a very limited number of transactions. Spain is hence granted 
only part of the points on licences and deliveries. Other states make their OSCE reports public, but separately from the arms export reports. These 
are therefore not taken into account in the Barometer.
7 The score takes into account the UK practice of reporting on export licences on a quarterly basis.
8 The United States receives full score on deliveries, as it is among the few countries that provide information to UN Comtrade on numbers of small 
arms transferred in all categories except parts/accessories of revolvers/pistols, parts/accessories of sporting/hunting weapons, and sometimes 
small arms ammunition.
Sources:  Australia (2003); Canada (2003); Czech Republic (2005); Finland (2004); France (2005); Germany (2005); Italy (2005); NISAT (2006); 
Norway (2005); Portugal (2005); Romania (2004); South Africa (2003); Spain (2005); Sweden (2005); Switzerland (2005); UK (2005); US (2005); UN 
Comtrade (2006)
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UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS: SOUTH AMERICA 
How many weapons are trafficked across the globe every year?15 What types of small arms are most commonly traf-
ficked? Which routes are used, and by which actors are they used?
To answer questions such as these, the Small Arms Survey has started asking governments for information about 
customs and police seizures of small arms and light weapons. The Small Arms Survey 2005 concluded that information 
of this type has been hard to come by, which might seem surprising, given the centrality of the illicit trade to inter-
governmental discussions on small arms. Preliminary conclusions for Europe presented last year were that handguns 
were the type of small arm most commonly smuggled, and that trafficking in the European context has been mostly 
small-scale (a handful of weapons at most per seizure) (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 116). This year, this chapter asks 
to what extent these findings hold true in another, quite different region of the world: South America.16 
Unlike most of the European and Western industrialized countries analyzed in the Small Arms Survey 2005, South 
America is composed of weak states whose governments have to cope (to different extents and at various levels) 
with organized crime; urban violence; institutional corruption; and long, porous, and poorly patrolled borders and/or 
coastlines.17 One country in the region is experiencing an ongoing internal armed conflict: Colombia. South America 
is also the core of the illicit cocaine industry. Cocaine trafficking directly affects three Andean countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Peru) and indirectly causes violent crime problems in the rest of the region, such as the presence of 
armed criminal groups in the slums (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro that are able to challenge police forces, for example 
(Dreyfus, 2002). These are all conditions that either provoke or facilitate illicit arms transfers to or across South 
American countries. South America hosts important small arms producers and exporters, namely Brazil (a major world 
exporter), Argentina (a relevant exporter at the regional level), and Chile and Colombia (significant producers at the 
regional level). This contributes to a regional dynamic of licit and illicit small arms transfers, particularly between 
countries in the south of the region (Dreyfus et al., 2003; Small Arms Survey, 2003, pp. 87–88).
Concerning small arms-related problems in general and illicit small arms transfers in particular, the region is not 
uniform, however. Brazil and Colombia, for example, have had serious problems with armed groups that exert effective 
territorial control (criminals in the case of Brazil and insurgent, paramilitary, and criminal groups in the case of 
Colombia) in either rural (Colombia) or urban (Colombia and Brazil) areas. Both countries at the same time rank 
among the top five countries globally in terms of firearms-related deaths (Phebo, 2005, p. 16). Bolivia and Peru face 
the challenge of organized crime in remote coca- and cocaine-producing regions of the country. Countries such as 
Suriname and Paraguay are used as transhipment routes for the rest of the region (Dreyfus et al., 2003; Cirino, Elizondo, 
and Wawro, 2004). Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina have reported recent cases of diversion of small arms from 
military and police stockpiles to insurgent or criminal groups in neighbouring countries.18 On the other hand, countries 
such as Chile and Uruguay do not register serious small arms-related crime problems (Dreyfus et al., 2003).
The Small Arms Survey sent questionnaires to the National Points of Contact (established according to the 
Programme) and/or small arms control agencies of the 12 countries of the region with questions relating to the type, 
destination, origin, and place of seizure of small arms seized by either customs or police agencies between 2000 and 
2004. Four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru) replied. Colombian authorities did not directly reply to the 
questionnaire, so for the case of Colombia, statistics reported by the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
implementation of the Programme and statistics on arms seizures provided by the Directorate of Judiciary Police 
(DIJIN) of the Colombian National Police were used.19 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Colombia 
are the largest small 
arms producers in 
South America.
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 In the case of Argentina, it was not possible to distinguish among seized, registered, and voluntarily handed over 
firearms. None of the data reported by these countries actually differentiates between seizures by customs officials and 
those by police agencies. In the cases of Chile and Peru, the data aggregates seizures made by all law enforcement 
agencies. Analysis of the cases of Brazil and Colombia, however, is based on disaggregated information regarding 
seizures made by various government agencies at the local (in the case of Brazil) and national levels. This provided 
a clearer picture of the places and situations in which these weapons were seized.
As Table 3.5 shows, handguns (revolvers and pistols) dominate among the weapons seized. A closer look at the 
information provided by specialized agencies such as the Brazilian Federal Police (specialized in the enforcement of 
federal laws and the repression of interstate crimes) or the Colombian Armed Forces (focusing on counterinsurgency 
operations), however, reveals a higher proportion of assault weapons. This is true for both statistical information and 
police reports. This is not surprising: in both countries, assault weapons cannot legally be sold to civilians, with the 
exception of collectors in Brazil (Brazil, 2000, arts. 9–11)  and in very limited, specific, and highly controlled cases 
in Colombia (COLOMBIA).
Brazil20
The Brazilian Federal Police provided a detailed description of the weapons most commonly seized at Brazilian 
airports, ports, and border controls. Since 1997, Brazil’s federal legislation on firearms control has required local police 
to enter data on seizures into the Federal Police arms database, Sistema Nacional de Armas (Brazil, 1997a, art. 1; 1997b, 
art. 38). This increased transparency was reinforced by a new firearms control law passed in December 2003 (Brazil, 
2003, art. 2; 2004, art. 1). Although the Brazilian government has been implementing the new law, there remains a 
lack of centralized and systematized data available at the national level (Dreyfus and de Sousa Nascimento, 2005, 
pp. 126–36).21 Based on the analysis of information provided by local police, the NGO Viva Rio and its associated 
research institute Instituto de Estudos da Religião (ISER) have provided additional information on the case of Rio de 
Janeiro, where there is a serious problem of territorial control by criminal organizations.
In the case of Rio de Janeiro, more than 80 per cent of small arms are Brazilian made. This is not surprising: Brazil 
is a large producer of small arms and recent research has demonstrated that many weapons that are legally exported 
by Brazil to neighbouring countries are later smuggled back into Brazil (Dreyfus et al., 2003, p. 34; Delegacia Legal, 
2005, pp. 17–18). 
Assault weapons are procured in Brazil by illegal non-state armed groups through theft, by diversion from official 
stockpiles, or via transfers from illicit international markets. According to Brazilian Federal Police sources, assault weapons 
are trafficked into Brazil primarily via either the ant trade or through a ‘pipette’ method, involving the disassembly of 
weapons prior to their shipment in individual part lots. Main identified points of entry for these weapons are the Triple 
Border Area between Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil; Santa Ana do Livramento on the border with Uruguay; and 
Uruguaiana on the Argentinian border.22 Law enforcement sources from Rio de Janeiro state, however, that in the specific 
case of that city, the illicit market for assault weapons has essentially been saturated during the 1990s.23 This is con-
firmed by the fact that the local police are no longer seizing new weapons, be they of Brazilian or of foreign origin. 
The illicit market in Rio de Janeiro has been concentrated more recently on the procurement of ammunition for those 
weapons already acquired (Dreyfus, 2006). Tougher legislation and stricter law enforcement controls and the dis-
mantling of criminal rings specializing in arms trafficking during the mid- to late 1990s also contributed to a decrease 
in illicit arms flows towards Rio de Janeiro (Dreyfus, 2006).
Most weapons seized 
in South America are 
handguns: revolvers 
and pistols.
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Colombia
In the case of Colombia, evidence suggests that large shipments of small arms arrived in the country through trans-
national illicit channels, with deliveries to either the Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) or the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) insurgents. These shipments were part of the trafficking of 10,000 
AK-47 assault rifles through Jordan and Peru that took place in 1999, with FARC as the final recipient [COLOMBIA]. 
Additional AK-47s were sent to the AUC in 2001 via Nicaragua and Panama (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 87). In 
addition, ammunition and weapons are diverted from armed groups and security forces of neighbouring countries, 
particularly Ecuador and Venezuela [COLOMBIA]. As Table 3.5 shows, the share of military firearms (assault rifles, 
machine guns, and sub-machine guns) is higher in the case of seizures made by the Colombian Army and Navy, 
whose focus is on counterinsurgency operations in rural areas. This is also the case for the Colombian DAS, which 
specifically targets criminal organizations and illegal armed groups. In the case of the Colombian National Police, 
who carry out regular policing in urban and rural areas, the number of seized handguns (revolvers and pistols, which 
are generally used by common criminals or illegally carried by civilians) is overwhelmingly higher than the quantity 
of seized military firearms. 
Chile
When compared to the rest of the region, Chile does not have significant problems related to small arms. The arms 
market for civilian use is very limited and depends largely on imports. Chile does not share borders with countries 
that report heavy arms trafficking, such as Paraguay, and its borders are hard to reach and generally well-patrolled. 
Furthermore, the security forces, especially the Carabineros, have a good reputation in terms of low levels of insti-
tutional corruption, which helps to restrain cross-border trafficking (Dreyfus et al., 2003, pp. 39–43). Where it is 
possible to see a growing increase in the use of small arms is in crime related to the trafficking and sale of illicit 
drugs. In the last decade, Chile has increasingly been used as a cocaine trafficking route from the Andean countries 
(primarily Peru and Bolivia), and there has also been a recorded increase in the use of and trafficking in coca paste 
in large cities. Coca paste distribution occurs mainly in the poor neighbourhoods of the southern metropolitan area 
(Santiago and Greater Santiago) and in other cities. It is precisely in police operations aimed at suppressing this type 
of crime in urban areas where more and more firearms are being confiscated (Dreyfus et al., 2003, pp. 39–43).
According to Chilean small arms control authorities, most weapons seized were manufactured in Argentina, 
Brazil, the United States, Spain, and Italy. The majority are older models.24 Combined with the fact that 30 per cent 
of weapons seized in Chile have had previous legal registration, this suggests that in Chile, theft and illicit domestic 
sales are a greater source for illicit weapons acquisition than international illicit transfers.25 Furthermore, the produc-
tion of craft weapons (hechizas) remains an important source for robbers and urban youth gang members (Small 
Arms Survey, 2003, pp. 28–29.)
An incident that received particular media attention in recent years was the diverting of confiscated weapons and 
small arms to drug trafficking bands. In late 2002 retired members of the military diverted AK-47 rifles captured in 
the 1980s during an operation against the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (whose armed branch was active until 
the mid-1990s) from the storage facilities of state security forces. Those concerned were later tried and removed from 
their positions (Dreyfus et al., 2003, p. 43). In Valparaíso in late September 2005, Carabineros dismantled a ring of 
non-commissioned officers and civilian personnel of the Chilean Army who were diverting small arms from military 
stockpiles to criminal groups (Ramírez, 2005, p. 3). It remains to be seen whether this was an isolated occurrence 
or whether such cases will come up again in Chile.
Compared to its 
neighbours, Chile 
does not have signif-
icant small arms-
related problems.
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Peru
With its insurgent movements defeated and demobilized in the second half of the 1990s, Peru’s main small arms 
problems are related to drug trafficking activities in jungle areas in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country 
and common criminality in its big cities. Like Chile, Peru does not have any significant production of commercially 
traded small arms. Both its licit and illicit markets depend on imports. According to reports by the Peruvian government, 
small arms trafficking (in small quantities) is concentrated in the northern borders of the country (Peru, 2005, p. 16).
Table 3.4 Reported seizures of small arms in selected South American countries, 2000—04
Country/Agency concerned 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Brazil (Civilian Police of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro)
10,789 10,973 18,232 20,052 5,315 65,361
Colombia (DIJIN—National 
Police)
42,355 44,656 47,353 47,837 63,037 245,238
Colombian Army n/a n/a n/a 5,924 8,214 14,138
Colombian Navy n/a n/a n/a 680 673 1,353
Colombia (DAS) n/a n/a n/a 315 521 836
Chile 4,909 n/a 2,192 2,537 2,592 12,230
Peru n/a c. 2,500 c. 1,500 c. 3,500 c. 2,500 c. 10,000 
Table 3.5 Reported seizures of small arms in selected South American countries by weapons type, 2000—04
Country/
Agency 
concerned
Revolvers Pistols Riﬂ es 
and 
carbines
Shot-
guns
Military 
and assault 
riﬂ es
Sub-
machine 
guns
Machine 
guns
Other Total
Brazil (Civilian 
Police of the 
State of Rio de 
Janeiro)
38,174 13,153 986 8,237 1,300 392 16 3,103 65,361
Colombia (DIJIN–
National Police)
118,132 46,302 467 30,268 1,507 n/a 1,209 n/a 197,885
Colombian Army 3,067 2,670 373 2,088 5,263 n/a 308 369 14,138
Colombian Navy 241 266 5 342 484 n/a 15 n/a 1,353
Colombia (DAS) 143 151 11 124 92 n/a 16 299 836
Chile Handguns: 8,405; long-barrel ﬁ rearms: 3,389; craft ﬁ rearms: 1,349. Data on handguns and long-barrel ﬁ rearms 
includes 922 small arms that were voluntarily handed over. 
Peru The information was not digitalized or presented in table format, so it was interpreted from graphs. Most of 
the seized small arms were revolvers and pistols, followed by craft ﬁ rearms and shotguns.
Notes on Brazil (Civilian Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro):
The total quantity of small arms seized in the State of Rio de Janeiro between 2000 and 2004 was actually 66,057; however, 5770 small arms were 
excluded because their records were not accurate enough to allow them to be classified by type, make, and country. Of the weapons seized within 
the period, 82% were made in Brazil, predominantly Taurus (43%) and Rossi (24%) revolvers and pistols. Among the foreign-made weapons, 41% 
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were made in the United States; 13% in Spain; 11% in Argentina; 11% in Belgium; 6% in Germany; 6% in Italy; 4% in Austria; and 8% in other countries. 
Among the 1,209 seized assault and military rifles, 46% were manufactured in the United States; 21% in Brazil; 11% in Belgium; 10% in Germany; 5% 
in China; 4% in the Russian Federation; 2% in Argentina; and 1% in other countries. Percentages were calculated by Viva Rio/ISER from a sample of 
59,596 weapons that had completed information concerning make, manufacturer and caliber.
Notes on Colombia (DIJIN–National Police):
Information for 2002 is not disaggregated by weapons type, and thus it was not included for the calculation of quantities of seizures by weapons type.
Notes on Colombian Army, Colombian Navy, and Colombia (DAS):
Information was provided only for 2003 and 2004.
Note on all Colombia figures:
The category 'machine guns' includes 'sub-machine guns'.
Sources:  Brazil: Civilian Police of Rio de Janeiro, processed and analyzed by Viva Rio/ISER; Colombia: Colombia (2005); data from the National 
Colombian Police, processed by CERAC; Organization of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), 2003–2004 report 
of the Government of Colombia to the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism of CICAD; Chile: National Directorate of General Mobilization; Peru: Peru 
(2005)
Box 3.4 AKs for Venezuela: reasons for concern 
On 18 May 2005 the Venezuelan Ministry of Defence signed a contract with the Russian Federation company Rosoboronexport 
for the delivery of 100,000 7.62 mm AK-103 assault rifles at a reported price of USD 386 per rifle and the compatible 7.62 x 39 mm 
ammunition for them. The delivery of the first batch of 28,000 rifles produced by Izhmash, which has to export combat small 
arms and light weapons through Rosoboronexport, was scheduled for October 2005, while a second batch of 35,000 AK-103s 
was to be delivered in December 2005. The contract will be completed after the last 37,000 rifles are shipped in March 2006. 
After that Venezuela will become the first country in the world to launch the licensed manufacturing of AK-103s and ammunition. 
The deal provoked negative reactions from the United States and Venezuela’s neighbour Colombia. Both expressed concerns 
that these small arms could be diverted into the hands of local insurgents or terrorist organizations (Pyadushkin, 2005).
There is, however, a more worrisome aspect to this purchase and subsequent licensing that is not directly related to the 
new rifles, but to the old FALs they are going to replace. As mentioned above, there is evidence of the diversion of small arms 
from the Venezuelan armed forces to insurgent groups in Colombia (Schroeder, 2004, pp. 22–23; Cragin and Hoffman, 2003, 
pp. 26—32). With the purchase of new rifles to completely equip and train its armed forces and reserves, Venezuela will have a 
huge surplus of its previous standard assault rifle, the FAL [PRODUCERS].
Another disquieting issue is that CAVIM, the state’s arms factory, will start producing 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition, which is exactly 
the kind of ammunition the FARC in Colombia is currently in desperate need of for 10,000 AK-47s they acquired in 1999 [COLOMBIA].
With plans to purchase large numbers of guns from 
the Russian Federation, Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez speaks to Russian President Vladimir 
Putin during a meeting in Moscow in November 
2004. © Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters
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CONCLUSION
This chapter, together with those of previous editions of the Small Arms Survey, shows that the scale and patterns 
of the authorized trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, parts, and accessories have been 
rather stable over the past few years. The trade has been estimated at around USD 4 billion for the last half-decade; 
the top exporters and—albeit to a lesser degree—the top importers of small arms have largely remained the same. 
Trading patterns have been stable: e.g. the share of ammunition in the overall small arms trade has remained more 
or less constant.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that everything is known about the trade in small arms and light weapons 
that there is to know. The Small Arms Survey estimates that roughly half of the small arms trade remains unaccounted 
for. This figure includes exports and imports widely regarded as among the most problematic: trade in certain types 
of light weapons such as MANPADS and mortars, and (to a lesser degree) other military small arms; trade in light 
weapons ammunition; the exports of countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan; and other issues.
Although the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer is meant to encourage greater transparency, there are 
generally strong reasons why many non-Western states choose to keep their exports (and imports) classified. Their 
goods are generally not competitive on Western markets and on some of the markets where Western-made guns are 
readily available. The incentives for such countries to turn to other markets, some of which would earn them strong 
and sustained criticism if publicly known, are therefore greater than for many Western states.
Every year, international intergovernmental organizations publish estimates of the scope of the illicit trade in 
drugs, for example. So far, no such collective intergovernmental effort has been made for guns. The difficulty that a 
non-governmental research body such as the Small Arms Survey has had to date in obtaining detailed high-quality 
information in this area may be an indication that a public–private partnership would be needed in this regard.
Lastly, findings for South America indicate that the harmonization of domestic small arms control laws is as 
important as intelligence, tracing, and other international control measures, as legal flaws in neighbouring countries 
are used by criminals in order to purchase and smuggle small arms across national borders. This is particularly 
important in the case of small-calibre handguns, which constitute the predominant group of weapons seized by the 
police, and are weapons that can be purchased by civilians in gun shops. Although there is evidence of illicit transfers 
of military firearms (assault rifles and sub-machine guns) from different parts of the world to crime settings and 
conflict areas in the region, the importance of the diversion of this kind of weapon from police and military stockpiles 
should not be neglected. Improving surplus disposal practices and stockpile security measures are important steps 
to prevent the illicit transfers of military firearms. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AUC             Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia
Barometer      Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer
CERAC          Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de 
                   Conflictos (Conflict Analysis Resource 
                   Centre)
FARC            Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
                   Colombia
HS               Harmonized System
ISER             Instituto de Estudos da Religião (Brazil)
MANPADS      man-portable air defence system(s)
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CHF             Swiss franc
DARM           Division of Repression of Small Arms 
                   Illicit Trafficking (Brazil)
DAS             Departamento Administrativo de 
                   Seguridad (Administrative Security Bureau, 
                   Colombia)
DIJIN            Directorate of Judiciary Police (Colombia)
EU               European Union
EUR              euro
ENDNOTES
1     Data is presented on actual deliveries of small arms rather than licences granted.
2     For details on the issue of mixed ammunition categories, see Glatz (2006).
3     For detailed information on UN Comtrade customs data, see Small Arms Survey (2005, Box 4.1, pp. 99–100). Further information is provided on 
the UN Comtrade and International Trade Centre Web sites: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/> and <http://www.intracen.org/index.htm>
4     For more information on this reliability measure, which essentially is based on comparing how well each country’s records correspond to the 
mirror reporting of its trading partners, see Marsh (2005) and ITC (2005).
5     Correspondence from the Republic of Sudan to the Embassy of Switzerland in Khartoum, 5 March 2006.
6     In UN Comtrade, China does not rank among the top exporters for either 1999–2003 or 2003 alone, but in 1998 it reported a total export value 
of USD 36,244,000 in category 930630 (UN Comtrade, 2006). Likely, China changed its reporting to UN Comtrade rather than its actual exports. 
It can thus be assumed that it ranks close to or among the top exporters of small arms ammunition also for the period 1999–2003. 
7     For details on the issue of mixed ammunition categories in UN Comtrade, see Glatz (2006).
8      Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena (2005, pp. 117–19) present examples of rocket-propelled artillery saturation systems exported by Brazil to Malaysia, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia being declared as ‘sporting and hunting shotguns’.
9     E-mail correspondence with Stefan Raykov, Ministry of Economy, Bulgaria, 26 September 2005.
10     See Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 105; 2004, pp. 109–11, Table 4.3; 2005, pp. 106–09, Table 4.2). Cyprus presents something of an enigma. The 
value of its imports has been too large to be explained by either local demand or the needs of a relatively small international peacekeeping 
force. Therefore it seems that Cyprus is the hub of a transit trade about which little is known. However, Cyprus publishes very little information 
about its exports of military small arms and light weapons, which actually account for the bulk of its imports. Unlike many of the other European 
Union (EU) member states, it does not publish a national arms export report. Moreover, unlike all other EU member states except Lithuania 
and Luxemburg, it submitted no information on any arms exports to the 2004 EU report on the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports (EU, 2004, p. 5, fn. 1). 
To date, Cyprus has not submitted any report on its implementation of the UN Programme of Action (Programme); neither has it established 
a point of contact, which is usually considered a first step in implementing the Programme.
11     See also Small Arms Survey (2005, CONFLICT SOURCING).
12      For an evaluation of the reporting in 2003, see Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne (2004). For an overview of information provided in national reports 
in 2002–2005, see Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne (2006). For electronic copies of the reports themselves, see <http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/
salw-nationalreports.html>.
13     See Small Arms Survey (2005, pp. 109–10) for further details.
14     For a detailed commentary on the reports, see Bauer and Bromley (2004).
15     For the scope of this section, the terms ‘illicit international transfers’, ‘illicit trafficking’, and ‘trafficking’ are used synonymously. 
16      South America includes the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.
17     The countries analysed last year were Australia, Canada, Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. With the exception of 
Poland and Romania, which are countries in transition, these countries can be defined as ‘strong states’ in terms of their socio-political cohesion, 
ML               Munitions List (of the Wassenaar 
                   Arrangement if not otherwise stated)
NISAT           Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms 
                   Transfers
Programme   UN Programme of Action
SEK              Swedish krona
SIPRI            Stockholm International Peace Research
                   Institute
UN Register    UN Register of Conventional Arms
USD              United States dollar
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territorial centrality, policy capacity, and socio-economic development. This definition of ‘strong’ versus ‘weak states’ is based on Buzan (1991, 
pp. 96–107, 113–14).
18     See Small Arms Survey (2003, pp. 87–88; 2004, pp. 51–54), Cragin and Hoffman (2003), Cirino, Elizondo, and Wawro (2004), Schroeder (2004), 
Dreyfus et al. (2003), and Fleitas (2005, p. 15).
19     These statistics were provided directly to the Small Arms Survey and the Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (Conflict Analysis 
Resource Centre—CERAC).
20     Brazil is a federal state divided into 26 states plus the Federal District.
21    E-mail information sent by an official of the Division of Repression of Small Arms Illicit Trafficking (DARM) of the Brazilian Federal Police 
Department, January 2006. 
22     E-mail information sent by an official of DARM of the Brazilian Federal Police Department, January, 2006. 
23    Interview with Delegate Carlos Oliveira, chief of the Firearms Enforcement Division of the Civilian Police of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 
August 2005.
24     E-mail communication with Coronel Marcelo Rebolledo, chief of arms and explosives of the National Directorate of General Mobilization of the 
Chilean Ministry of Defence, October 2005.
25     Percentage calculated from data sent by the National Directorate of General Mobilization.
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